Germany in decline – Europe paralyzed

"My motto is cheerful pessimism. Since I can think politically, Germany has been going downhill. But on this long road down, there are still a number of beautiful days."

Jan Fleischhauer, former editor of Der Spiegel, is occasionally quoted as uttering this rather sobering statement.

My reflexive inclination is to dismiss this melancholic resignation as premature self-abandonment. A thorough reality check however reveals that Jan Fleischhauer seems to be not so far off the mark.

1. Germany's path to insignificance

The "Deutsche Bahn", as all Germans who have ever entrusted themselves to it in good faith know, has been operating for years on the brink of total collapse. Formerly an iconic symbol of reliability, has degraded materially - particularly in long-distance operations. DB’s own reporting frames the situation as a consequence of aging infrastructure and construction backlogs, and it references stabilisation efforts and operational measures. Yes, true, but the question is legitimate: "How did we get there?" Aren’t there deeper-rooted reasons, some lack of community spirit, a wider cultural decline, rather than just occasional infrastructure underinvestment over decades?

Germanys chemical industry, once world class, is struggling as high and unpredictable energy prices let local production appear unattractive and investments resembling gambles. Although there might be cyclical factors at work as well, never before, with exception of phases after lost world wars, the pressure was felt that intense, increasingly being associated with relocation trends. Major chemical players have explicitly linked "adjustments" to the post-cheap-gas reality. BASF e.g. announced shutdowns of energy-intensive capacity and job reductions with references to changed conditions, including energy.

The fact that Europe had to exchange cheap Russian gas for expensive US LNG is usually attributed to Russia's attack on Ukraine. While this confrontation cannot be dismissed as the core trigger, it did not arise out of nowhere. It had been carefully crafted by the two rival superpowers over two and a half decades. Our leaders meekly accepted the inconvenient truth that the tiny European states had no choice in this game of great powers but to take the role of happy vassals because, in the short term, it was simply the most convenient alternative for them.

The German automotive industry, once one of the pillars of the German economy, has been rudely awakened from its dreams. It is now playing catch-up in the electric mobility sector, while its strengths in the field of combustion engines are becoming less and less relevant. While companies are pointing to market forces that are averse to electric vehicles, potential buyers are missing attractive offers and the necessary charging infrastructure. Having completely misjudged cost curves, China’s scale and speed, the sector is now operating in a catch-up mode under now harsher competitive economics. So, there is obviously something rotten in the automotive state of Germany.

In his famous "jolt speech" [1], former German President Roman Herzog (1994–1999) already back then called for a shake-up in Germany. There may have been a few minor tremors since then, but the situation has not changed substantially.

On January 24, 2026, even Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, a staunch transatlanticist who is otherwise known for her rude tone and unacceptable messages, said something simple but true on "The Pioneer" [2], advocating for a change...

"If we continue with this petty statism in Europe, we will simply be eaten up by the US, the Chinese, and the Russians."

... and ...

"Because we no longer have reliable partners in the United States and we see that the US, China, and Russia are beginning to divide up the globe among themselves, a strong Europe is vital for our survival. And that includes a strong economy."

It is rather questionable whether we ever had a "reliable partner in the United States". Rather the term "happy vassal", that has become a term of art in the recent debates in Davos [3], characterises our role up to today.

The three randomly selected examples above alone do highlight the need for action. But we are not alone. There still are our "European compatriots". Together we are strong, right? So, what is the situation there?

2. And Europe?

The EU is rather showing signs of further disintegration. Even its name is a euphemism. This loose confederation of states is far from likening a "union," more comparable to a poker game in which each player plays with hidden cards and intending to get as much as possible for their respective home country out of the big pot. And in fact, each member of the politically decisive Council of Ministers must first and foremost fulfil their purely national mandate.

We are probably world champions when it comes to arguing and tussling. We only find unity when our big brother from across the pond proverbially steers us in the desired direction "speaking softly while carrying a big stick." [1]

This new tone from across the Atlantic surprises us, although it shouldn’t. James Dorsey, a senior fellow at the Nanyang Technological University of Singapore (NTU) S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), told Lianhe Zaobao that Donald Trump is just "more candid" than past US presidents.

"When his predecessors intervened in the country, it was to promote democracy, human rights, those were the issues that were raised. Donald Trump is blunt about it. This is about dominance. ‘This is our hemisphere, and we are going to dominate it.’"

An even more disturbing view is conveyed by Professor Calvin Jillson, Department of Political Science, Southern Methodist University. To his perception Trump seems to have a global vision in which regional hegemons hold sway, "the US in the Americas, Russia in Europe and China in Asia".

If there is even a grain of truth in this, it should be cause for concern among the European population—not among their political leaders, who only look four or five years ahead and then only with a firm eye on their personal careers.

There are however clear-eyed observers of the scene. With respect to the currently raging Ukraine war, on January 24, 2026 Jvan Ricciardella concluded his LinkedIn post "Europe at the Crossroads of Reality":

"The reopening of dialogue with Moscow by France, Italy, and Germany does not signal a sudden embrace of compromise, but the delayed acknowledgment of a truth Europe has struggled to face: this war cannot be managed indefinitely through slogans, sanctions, and moral absolutism. The European Union’s institutional rigidity, Britain’s reflexive escalation, America’s selective disengagement, and the erosion of global mediating structures together form a landscape in which the old rules no longer apply. Europe now stands at a crossroads, forced to choose between adapting to a multipolar reality or clinging to a fractured narrative of unity that no longer corresponds to power, credibility, or consequence. The longer this choice is deferred, the higher the price will be—not only for Ukraine, but for Europe itself."

The sobering realization is slowly sinking into the minds of our supposed thought leaders. On Jan 24, 2026 Henry Farrell commented [4] on the first timidly defiant reactions:

"The Europeans were finally pushed to the point where they pushed back. As Belgium’s prime minister put it, ‘Living as a happy vassal is one thing, existing as a miserable slave is another.’ [5] It was clear that the Europeans were finally becoming willing to retaliate against Trump."

Others, dictated by their profession point to the chances, this situation may offer. In the wake of the big Davos happening Nick Studer, CEO Oliver Wyman and Marsh Management Consulting, wrote on January 24, 2026 in the Oliver Wyman newsletter …

"Europe arrived in Davos under intense pressure: tariffs, Ukraine, energy security, and even Greenland. The mood was notably different from 2025, when concern over regulation and competitiveness dominated. This year, the conversation shifted toward agency.

Nowhere was this clearer than in defence. Europe is taking far greater responsibility for its own security, with sharply increased military spending, especially on hardware and advanced technologies. This is a strategic necessity but also has the potential to become economic stimulus across the EU and NATO Europe, including the UK, provided execution keeps up with ambition.

Beyond defence, the Savings and Investments Union emerged as an attempt to channel trillions in savings towards AI, data infrastructure, industrial renewal and the energy transition. Europe does not lack capital. It lacks a functioning financing continuum, speed, and will. There is much that national governments can do, and the EU must accelerate too. That gap … remains Europe's biggest constraint.

Europe's opportunity is real, but only for organizations prepared to navigate fragmentation, standardization challenges, and slower policy execution. The winners will help shape the ecosystem, not wait for it to settle."

3. Europe at the crossroads

You can practically feel it: Europe has arrived at a critical moment, one of those, which occur only a few times in history, one that calls not for despair but for clarity, dignity, and renewal. If recent years have pushed the continent into a defensive posture, cast as a victim caught between the United States and China, slowed by internal frictions, and anxious about the erosion of its post-Cold War certainties, the decades ahead demand a different stance: standing upright rather than crouched, shedding the language and psychology of victimhood, and reclaiming the confidence that once made Europe a cradle of ideas, diplomacy, craftsmanship, and institutional imagination.

What Europe experiences today, is the winding down of a centuries-long cycle: the age of Western hegemony built on technological excellence, colonial reach, financial dominance, and cultural authority. That era, for which the questionable term "rule-based world order" was coined, was fading for quite a while. Now it seems to be over. The world has broadened. capabilities have dispersed. New centres of economic gravity and competence have emerged. For a while Europe enjoyed a quiet and modestly prosperous time in the backwaters of the American hegemony. With the American hegemony coming to an end however, Europe find itself rudely awakened. Its stagnation arose from the illusion that the world would orbit indefinitely around a Western centre while China rose, second line powers grew and the US overplayed its cards.

4. So, what can we do?

Yes, what can we do about it? The answer to this overwhelming question is obvious, simple, but difficult to implement: Europe unite!

Other than the current EU, we need a Europe as an entity that is self-confident, sovereign, independent, strong in terms of economy, defence and soft power, credible, reliable and globally respected, appearing monolithic to the outside world, diverse internally, reflecting its cultural richness, living up to its own ideals and values – in short, a multi-nation state, simply called "Europe".

Who then is "we"? Well, It’s us – we, the people. We will not be salvaged by our elected representatives. They are driven by quite different, more intrinsic forces. Apparently, representatives are elected to establish policies for the people’s benefit, hereby leaving them free to pursue their livelihoods, which often is demanding enough. In theory, those representatives are sworn to reflect the will of those who elected them. In practice, once ensconced in ruling centre of gravity, far from their home bases, they are free to do pretty much as they please as Washington correspondent William Greider candidly describes in his 1992 book "Who Will Tell The People?". 

It is quite obviously the task of a grassroots movement, a community that is consistently committed to its goals, whose internal structure does not, as is usually the case, propel psychopaths to the top to wield power, that takes politics seriously and conducts it differently than has been customary up to now.

This movement already exists. It is still small. It must and will grow, spreading to all European countries that stand in the liberal tradition of the European Enlightenment.

It will work from within and from below, and it will influence our future: The Europeans for the Planet.

---

[1] As Theodore Roosevelt, 26^th President of the United States famously proclaimed in a public speech on September 2, 1901, at the Minnesota State Fair (shortly before becoming president)

---

[1] https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/bundespraesident-roman-herzog-ruck-rede-100.html

[2] https://www.thepioneer.de/originals/der-achte-tag/podcasts/erschuettert-entsetzt-entgeistert

[3] https://www.programmablemutter.com/p/davos-is-a-rational-ritual

[4] https://www.programmablemutter.com/p/davos-is-a-rational-ritual

[5] https://www.ft.com/content/0fa02c9e-9b02-4aa7-a07a-2387eba75b99

Selten war mir so elend, wenn sich meine Vermutungen bestätigten.

Selten habe ich mich so elend gefühlt, wenn sich meine Befürchtungen bestätigt haben.

Es sieht aus wie ein großer Plan – ein heimtückischer aus europäischer Sicht, ein genialer aus Sicht der Trump-Administration –, aber vielleicht auch deren Grabstein.

"Es ist offiziell: Trump will eine schwächere Europäische Union", schrieb Ian Bremmer am 10. Dezember 2025 [1] .

Er fuhr fort:

"Die transatlantischen Beziehungen befinden sich nicht an einem Scheideweg, sie haben ihn bereits hinter sich. Amerikas neue nationale Sicherheitsstrategie bestätigt, was die Europäer seit der Rede von Vizepräsident JD Vance im vergangenen Februar in München befürchtet haben: Washington sieht eine starke, geeinte Europäische Union nun als ein Problem, das gelöst werden muss, nicht als einen Verbündeten, den es zu unterstützen gilt."

Für eine Hegemonialmacht ist "divide et impera" (Teile und herrsche [2]) eine Grundregel. Schließen sich Nationen hingegen zusammen, selbst in einem lockeren Staatenbund wie der EU, muss dies als Bedrohung betrachtet werden.

Diese Ansicht ist nicht so abwegig, wie es auf den ersten Blick scheinen mag. Vielmehr kann sie als ein bewährtes Prinzip der präventiven Verteidigung betrachtet werden. Es gibt umfangreiche historische Belege dafür, dass das kaiserliche China eine diplomatische und militärische Strategie anwandte, die als  Yi Yi Zhi Yi  (以夷制夷) [3] bekannt ist und oft mit  "Barbaren zur Kontrolle von Barbaren" übersetzt wird . Dieser real-politische Ansatz zielte darauf ab, die chinesische Souveränität zu wahren, indem interne Gegensätze unter Nomadenstämmen ausgenutzt oder rivalisierende ausländische Mächte gegeneinander ausgespielt wurden.

Dieser Gedanke spiegelt auch Henry Farrells Überlegung vom 6. Dezember wider ^: "Amerika hat seinen größten Feind ausgemacht: Westeuropa" [4].

In seinem Kommentar zur Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie (NSS [5]) der Trump-Administration führte er außerdem aus:

Die neue globale Strategie der Trump-Regierung ist eine Art Groyper-Strategie-Cosplay [6], die sich gleichzeitig als Leitfaden für konkrete Politik ausgibt. Sie ist zum Scheitern verurteilt, selbst nach ihren eigenen lächerlichen und zutiefst beleidigenden Maßstäben. Wie ich meinen Studenten immer sagte: Eine nationale Sicherheitsstrategie richtet sich an drei Zielgruppen: die US-Regierung selbst, Verbündete und Freunde sowie Gegner. Die neue Strategie lässt sich von der ersten Gruppe nicht kohärent umsetzen, wird die zweite noch weiter verprellen und der dritten neue Möglichkeiten eröffnen.”

Wenig Trost bietet uns Europäern seine abschließende Feststellung, insbesondere jenen, die sich zuvor als überzeugte Transatlantiker präsentierten:

"Die Vision der Trump-Regierung von Amerikas Größe führt dazu, dass das Land ärmer, schwächer und gemeiner wird. Das neue Strategiepapier wird seinen Teil dazu beitragen, diesen Prozess zu beschleunigen."

Für die sendungsbewusste Anne Applebaum [7] , Redakteurin bei  The Atlantic [8] , ist die NSS sogar gleichbedeutend mit "Der längste Abschiedsbrief in der amerikanischen Geschichte – Die neue nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Trump-Regierung zielt auf die liberale Demokratie selbst." [9]

Jedenfalls erhalten wir derzeit reichlich Bestätigung für die Aussage der ehemaligen deutschen Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel, die mit den Worten zitiert wird: "Die USA sind kein verlässlicher Partner mehr für Europa" [10] .

Man könnte sich fragen, ob sie das jemals gewesen sind.

Wie als Bestätigung für diese Zweifel, soll Henry Kissinger Gerüchten zufolge einmal gesagt haben: "Amerika hat keine ewigen Freunde oder Feinde, nur Interessen".

Damit erwähnte er eines der Leitprinzipien offensiven Großmachtpolitik, deren prominentester, lautester und umstrittenster Verfechter derzeit John Mearsheimer [11] ist. Lange Zeit sträubte ich mich gegen diese Theorie – bis die zahlreichen historischen und aktuellen Beispiele nicht länger ignoriert werden konnten.

Um die aktuelle Situation etwas nüchterner zu betrachten, möchte ich aus dem neuesten Newsletter von Oliver Wyman [12] zitieren:

"Der Jahreswechsel bietet eine gute Gelegenheit zur Reflexion – nicht nur über Vergangenes, sondern auch über die übergeordneten Kräfte, die die Zukunft prägen. Viele dieser Kräfte haben sich über mehr als ein Jahrzehnt im Stillen entwickelt, doch es wächst das Gefühl, dass wir einen tiefgreifenden Wandel erleben, uns von einer Ordnung in die nächste bewegen, ohne jedoch eine klare Vorstellung davon zu haben, wie diese neue aussehen wird.

Den letzten wirklichen Wendepunkt hatten wir am Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs, als die Vereinigten Staaten zur globalen Supermacht aufstiegen und die geopolitische Architektur sowie die Einsatzregeln neu geschrieben wurden.

Heute ist die alte Ordnung zerbrochen, bevor eine neue entstehen konnte. Wir bewegen uns von einer der friedlichsten Perioden der Menschheitsgeschichte in eine weitaus stärker  umkämpfte. Die Vereinigten Staaten haben nun einen ebenbürtigen Konkurrenten – eine Nation, die in der Lage ist, mit ihrer Wirtschaftskraft, ihrem technologischen Ehrgeiz und ihrer geografischen Reichweite mitzuhalten. Die Welt kehrt zu Einflusssphären zurück, wobei die USA und China die Machtverhältnisse bestimmen werden und Europa unbehaglich zwischen den Fronten gefangen ist."

Warum bin ich deswegen so unglücklich? Nun, ich habe es ja kommen sehen. In meinem Blogbeitrag vom 18.09.2021 mit dem Titel "Quo vadis Europe? – Den alten Kontinent neu denken" [13] schrieb ich einmal:

"Europa braucht mehr Gewicht

Wenn wir nicht zum Spielball fremder Mächte, nicht zum Opfer globaler Entwicklungen und nicht zwischen rivalisierenden Machtblöcken zerrieben werden wollen, dann müssen wir uns neu erfinden.

Wenn wir auf der Weltbühne als respektierter Akteur wahrgenommen werden wollen, wenn wir uns selbst ernst nehmen wollen, dann müssen wir Europa als politische Einheit schaffen. Ja, wir müssen es zuerst schaffen. Denn das Europa, das wir für diese Notwendigkeit brauchen, existiert noch nicht, es wurde noch nicht einmal konsequent vorgedacht."

Das Problem ist also da. Es lässt sich nicht länger ignorieren – auch wenn unsere überforderten Politiker ihr Bestes geben, genau das zu tun. Jemand muss endlich handeln. Und das haben wir getan. Denn dieser "Jemand", sind wir alle. Wir haben die "Europäer für den Planeten" gegründet [14].

Wir haben uns drei Aufträge gegeben:

• Das Überleben der Menschheit in einer nachhaltigen und intakten Umwelt zu gewährleisten,
  
  
• Unsere spezifisch europäischen bürgerlichen Freiheiten zu bewahren, 
  
  
• Ein geeintes Europa als Vielvölkerstaat mit einheitlicher Außen-, Verteidigungs-, Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik schaffen.

Wenn Ihr unsere Überzeugung teilt, dass Europa als Idee und Wirklichkeit wert ist, erhalten zu werden – worauf wartet Ihr dann noch?

Komm und schließ dich uns an [15] .

Referenzen

---

[1] Bremmer, I. (10. Dezember 2025). Es ist offiziell: Trump will eine schwächere Europäische Union. GZERO Media. Abgerufen von https://www.gzeromedia.com/by-ian-bremmer/trump-wants-weaker-european-union

[2] Wikipedia-Autoren . (o. J.). Teile und herrsche. In: Wikipedia, Die freie Enzyklopädie. Abgerufen am 21.12.2025 von https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divide_and_conquer

[3] Park, SB (2020). Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen China und Korea während der Qing-Dynastie (1882–1895): Eine Studie zur “Yi-Yi-Zhi-Yi“-Diplomatiestrategie (Masterarbeit). Nanyang Technological University, Singapur. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/149168 dr.ntu.edu.sg

Diese Masterarbeit untersucht die sino-koreanischen diplomatischen Beziehungen während der späten Qing-Dynastie anhand der Yi-Yi-Zhi-Yi- Strategie (以夷制夷, “Barbar gegen Barbar“). Der Autor argumentiert, dass die Außenpolitik des Qing-Chinas gegenüber Chosŏn-Korea von 1882 bis 1895 im Kontext des zunehmenden westlichen und japanischen Einflusses als strategische Anwendung dieses Paradigmas und nicht als konventionelle Tributdynamik zu verstehen ist. Die Arbeit ist nützlich für Forschende, die sich mit historischen diplomatischen Strategien, regionalen Machtdynamiken in Ostasien und sich wandelnden Paradigmen der internationalen Beziehungen befassen, und ist unter der Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) lizenziert. dr.ntu.edu.sg

[4] Farrell, H. (6. Dezember 2025). Amerika hat seinen größten Feind identifiziert: Westeuropa. Programmable Mutter. Abgerufen von https://www.programmablemutter.com/p/america-has-identified-its-final

[5] Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP . 9. Dezember 2025. Das Weiße Haus veröffentlicht die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie 2025. Abgerufen von https://www.bhfs.com/insight/white-house-releases-2025-national-security-strategy/

[6] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia . (o. J.). Nick Fuentes. In: Encyclopædia Britannica. Abgerufen am 21.12.2025 von https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nick-Fuentes

[7] Applebaum, A. (o. J.). Anne Applebaum. The Atlantic. Abgerufen am 21.12.2025 von https://www.theatlantic.com/author/anne-applebaum/

[8] Weltnachrichten . (o. J.). The Atlantic. Abgerufen am 21.12.2025 von https://www.theatlantic.com/world/

[9] Applebaum, A. (Dezember 2025). Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie und Demokratie. The Atlantic. Abgerufen von https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2025/12/national-security-strategy-democracy/685270/

[10] CBC News. (7. Mai 2017). Merkel und Trump sprechen über die NATO, Trump sagt: “Wir werden uns um den IS kümmern.“ https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/merkel-trump-1.4136906

[11] University of Chicago , Department of Political Science. (o. J.). John Mearsheimer. Abgerufen am 21.12.2025 von https://political-science.uchicago.edu/directory/John-Mearsheimer

[12] Oliver Wyman . (o. J.). Startseite. Abgerufen am 21.12.2025 von https://www.oliverwyman.com/index.html

[13] Walther, H. (September 2021). Quo vadis Europe? Rethinking the old continent. Horst Walthers Blog. Abgerufen von https://horst-walther.blogspot.com/2021/09/quo-vadis-europe-rethinking-old.html

[14] Europäer für den Planeten (o. J.). Die Partei für Europas Platz in der Welt . Abgerufen am 21.12.2025 von https://eufp.de/

[15] Join — Europaer für den Planeten . (nd). Europaer für den Planeten. Abgerufen am 21.12.2025 von https://eufp.de/join/

Rarely have I felt so miserable that my assumptions became reality.

Rarely have I felt so miserable that my suspicions were confirmed

It looks like a grand plan – an insidious one from the European perspective, a genial one according to the Trump administration – but maybe even the latter’s tomb stone.

“It’s official: Trump wants a weaker European Union” Ian Bremmer wrote on December 10, 2025 [1].

He went on to state:

“The transatlantic relationship isn’t at a crossroads, it’s past one. America’s new National Security Strategy confirms what Europeans have feared since Vice President JD Vance’s speech in Munich last February: Washington now sees a strong, unified European Union as a problem to be solved, not an ally to be supported.”

If you are a hegemon, “devide et impera”(divide and conquer [2]) is imperative. But if to the contrary, nations unite, even if in a loose confederation, like the EU, this must be regarded as a threat.

This view is not as far-fetched as it may seem at first glance. Rather it can be viewed as a time-tested principle of pre-emptive defence. There is extensive historical evidence that imperial China employed a diplomatic and military strategy known as yi yi zhi yi (以夷制夷) [3], often translated as "using barbarians to control barbarians". This realpolitik approach aimed to maintain Chinese sovereignty by exploiting internal divisions among nomadic tribes or pitting rival foreign powers against one another

It also echoes Henry Farrell’s December 6^th contemplation: “America has identified its greatest enemy: Western Europe”[4]

While commenting on the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS [5]) he further outlined:

“The Trump administration’s new strategy for the world is a kind of Groyper [6] Grand Strategy Cosplay, which simultaneously purports to be a guide to specific policy. It is set to fail, even by its own ludicrous and wildly offensive standards. As I used to tell my students, a National Security Strategy speaks to three audiences: the U.S. government itself; allies and friends, and adversaries. The new strategy can’t be coherently implemented by the first, will alienate the second still further, and will open up opportunities to the third.”

It offers little comfort to us Europeans, especially those who previously presented themselves as staunch transatlanticists, when he closes:

“The Trump administration’s vision of American greatness is making the country poorer, weaker, and meaner. The new strategy document will do its own little bit to accelerate that process.”

For the hawkish Anne Applebaum [7], a staff writer at The Atlantic [8], the NSS is even equal to “The Longest Suicide Note in American History - The Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy targets liberal democracy itself.” [9]

Anyway, we currently receive ample confirmation for former German Chancellor Angela Merkel. who is quoted “U.S. no longer a reliable partner for Europe” [10].

One might wonder, if it ever was.

As if to confirm these doubts, Henry Kissinger according to rumours once said that "America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests"

Hereby he mentioned one of the guiding principles when we agree to follow the rules of great power politics, whose most visible, vocal, and controversial proponent is currently John Mearsheimer [11]. For a long time, I resisted accepting this theory—until the numerous historical examples could no longer be ignored.

For a slightly more sober view of the current situation, I would like to quote from the latest Oliver Wyman [12] newsletter:

"The year end is a good time for reflection — not just on what has happened, but on the larger forces shaping what comes next. Many of those forces have been building quietly for more than a decade, but there is a growing sense we are living through a profound shift, moving from one order to the next, but without a clear view of what the new one will look like.

The last true inflection point came at the end of the Second World War, when the United States emerged as a global superpower and the geopolitical architecture and rules of engagement were rewritten.

Today, the old order has fractured before a new one has emerged. We are moving from one of the most peaceful periods in human history into a far more contested one. The United States now has a genuine peer competitor — a nation capable of matching its economic might, technological ambition, and geographical reach. The world is returning to spheres of influence, with the US and China defining the geometry of power and Europe uncomfortably caught in between."

Why do I feel so miserable about it? Well, I saw it all coming. In my 2021-09-18 Blog post “Quo vadis Europe? - Rethinking the old continent” [13] I once wrote:

“Europe needs more weight

If we do not want to be the plaything of foreign powers, not the victim of global developments, not ground down between rival power blocs, then we have to reinvent ourselves.

If we want to be taken seriously as a respected player on the world stage, if we want to take ourselves seriously, then we have to create Europe. Yes, we have to create it first. Because the Europe we need for this goal does not yet exist, it has not even been consistently conceived.”

So, the problem is here. It can’t be ignored any longer - although our overwhelmed politicians try their best to do so. Someone finally has to take action. And so, we did. We founded the “ Europeans for the Planet” [14].

We have committed ourselves to three mandates:

• To ensure the survival of humanity in a sustainable and intact environment.
• To preserve our distinctly European civil liberties.
• To establish a Europe as a multi-nation state following unified foreign, defence, financial, and economic policies.

If you share our conviction that Europe is worth surviving as an idea and a reality – what are you waiting for?

Come and join [15] us.

References

---

[1] Bremmer, I. (2025, December 10). It’s official: Trump wants a weaker European Union. GZERO Media. Retrieved from https://www.gzeromedia.com/by-ian-bremmer/trump-wants-weaker-european-union

[2] Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Divide and conquer. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 2025-12-21, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divide_and_conquer

[3] Park, S. B. (2020). The political relations between China and Korea during Qing dynasty (1882–1895): The study on the “yi‑yi‑zhi‑yi” diplomatic strategy (Master’s thesis). Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/149168 dr.ntu.edu.sg

  This master’s thesis examines Sino‑Korean diplomatic relations during the late Qing dynasty through the lens of the yi‑yi‑zhi‑yi (以夷制夷, “barbarian against barbarian”) strategy. The author argues that Qing China’s foreign policy toward Chosŏn Korea from 1882 to 1895 should be understood as a strategic application of this paradigm, rather than as conventional tributary dynamics, in the context of increasing Western and Japanese influence. This work is useful for researchers studying historical diplomatic strategies, regional power dynamics in East Asia, and evolving international relations paradigms, and is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution‑NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY‑NC 4.0). dr.ntu.edu.sg

[4] Farrell, H. (2025, December 6). America has identified its greatest enemy: Western Europe. Programmable Mutter. Retrieved from https://www.programmablemutter.com/p/america-has-identified-its-final

[5] Brownstein Hyatt Farber SchreckLLP. 2025, December 9). White House releases 2025 National Security Strategy. Retrieved from https://www.bhfs.com/insight/white-house-releases-2025-national-security-strategy/

[6] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. (n.d.). Nick Fuentes. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 2025-12-21, from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nick-Fuentes

[7] Applebaum, A. (n.d.). Anne Applebaum. The Atlantic. Retrieved 2025-12-21, from https://www.theatlantic.com/author/anne-applebaum/

[8] World news. (n.d.). The Atlantic. Retrieved 2025-12-21, from https://www.theatlantic.com/world/

[9] Applebaum, A. (2025, December). National security strategy and democracy. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2025/12/national-security-strategy-democracy/685270/

[10] CBC News. (2017, May 7). Merkel, Trump discuss NATO, Trump says 'we'll take care of' ISIS. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/merkel-trump-1.4136906

[11] The University of Chicago, Department of Political Science. (n.d.). John Mearsheimer. Retrieved 2025-12-21, from https://political-science.uchicago.edu/directory/John-Mearsheimer

[12] Oliver Wyman. (n.d.). Home. Retrieved 2025-12-21, from https://www.oliverwyman.com/index.html

[13] Walther, H. (2021, September). Quo vadis Europe? Rethinking the old continent. Horst Walther’s Blog. Retrieved from https://horst-walther.blogspot.com/2021/09/quo-vadis-europe-rethinking-old.html

[14] Europeans for the Planet (n.d.). The party for Europe's place in the world. Retrieved 2025-12-21, from https://eufp.de/

[15] Join — Europäer für den Planeten. (n.d.). Europäer für den Planeten. Retrieved 2025-12-21, from https://eufp.de/join/

If you too believe that...

If you too believe that...

1. we need to take decisive action against further devastation of our planet,
   
   
2. climate change knows no compromises,
   
   
3. grand promises must finally be followed by decisive action,
   
   
4. we must ensure that our civil liberties are not compromised in the process,
   
   
5. Germany, with its 1% of the world's population, is too small to make a difference globally,
   
   
6. we need at least one state, "Europe"—unified externally, diverse internally, strong, peaceful, independent, and self-confident,
   
   
7. we must act more as a community to meet the enormous challenges ahead,
   
   
8. it is not enough to give a politician the mandate to shape our future every four years.,
   
   
9. politics must be everyone's daily responsibility,
   
   
10. you should get more involved,

... then you've come to the right place.

Then you should join "Europeans for the Planet" (https://eufp.de/join/).

Wenn auch Du glaubst, dass ...

Wenn auch Du glaubst, dass ...

1. wir entschlossen gegen eine weitere Verwüstung unseres Planeten vorgehen müssen,
   
   
2. das Klima keine Kompromisse schließt,
   
   
3. den großen Versprechungen endlich konsequente Maßnahmen folgen müssen,
   
   
4. wir darauf achten müssen, dass unsere liberalen Bürgerfreiheiten dabei nicht beschädigt werden,
   
   
5. Deutschland mit seinen 1% der Weltbevölkerung zu klein ist, um weltweit etwas zu bewegen, 
   
   
6. es dafür mindestens einen Staat „Europa“ braucht – nach außen einheitlich, nach innen divers, stark, friedfertig, unabhängig und selbstbewusst,
   
   
7. wir wieder mehr als Gemeinschaft handeln müssen, um den gewaltigen, vor uns liegenden Herausforderungen begegnen zu können,
   
   
8. es nicht ausreicht, alle 4 Jahre zur Wahl zu gehen,
   
   
9. Politik die tägliche Aufgabe eines jeden von uns sein muss,
   
   
10. Du Dich selbst stärker einbringen solltest,

... dann bist du bei uns richtig.

Dann solltest Du Dich den „Europäern für den Planeten“ anschließen (https://eufp.de/join/). 

Die erschreckende Hilflosigkeit der EU

 

Eine kleine Anmerkung zum Bild: Die KI hat die Anfrage geringfügig missverstanden. Änderungen anzufordern war jedoch sinnlos. Sie hätten lediglich zu völlig anderen Ergebnissen geführt. Das Bild ist dennoch eindrucksvoll :-)

In seinem heutigen Newsletter „Sinification“ hat Jacob Mardell Zhao Junjies Argumente treffend unter dem Titel „Die Angst der EU vor Seltenen Erden“ zusammengefasst.

„Die von der EU in der Frage der Seltenen Erden an den Tag gelegte Besorgnis und Hilflosigkeit offenbaren die Widersprüche und Dilemmata im Kern ihrer Chinapolitik.“

Mardell fährt fort: „Zhaos Kommentare sind zwar oft unfair, wenn nicht gar irreführend, enthalten aber einige unangenehme Seitenhiebe – beispielsweise die Feststellung, dass Europas Misere bei den Seltenen Erden teilweise selbstverschuldet sei, das Ergebnis jahrelanger Verlagerung ressourcenintensiver Industrien in Entwicklungsländer.“

Junjies Warnung vor einer Entspannung zwischen den USA und China ist besonders beunruhigend: „Wenn“ – nicht „falls“ – „China und die Vereinigten Staaten einen Konsens erzielen oder sich versöhnen, wird sich die EU in einer zunehmend schwierigen Lage wiederfinden“, betont er.

Die Kernpunkte dieser offiziellen chinesischen Sichtweise auf Europa sollten nicht ignoriert werden:

1. Europas Fixierung auf die Seltene-Erden-Frage spiegelt Brüssels tiefe strategische Besorgnis wider, nicht nur rein wirtschaftliche.
   
   
2. Die Verwundbarkeit ist größtenteils selbstverschuldet, nachdem jahrelang umweltschädliche, ressourcenintensive Industrien in Entwicklungsländer verlagert wurden.
   
   
3. Anstatt auf industrielle Stärke zu setzen, nutzte Europa seine Marktgröße und setzte Regulierungen ein, um global normative Macht auszuüben.
   
   
4. Europas Verwundbarkeit ist real, doch gerade deshalb sollte es vermeiden, die Seltene-Erden-Frage zu politisieren und den Begriff der nationalen Sicherheit zu überdehnen – dass es dies weiterhin tut, ist symptomatisch für seine Arroganz.
   
   
5. Washington priorisiert seine eigenen Interessen und sieht die EU als strategischen Spielball an. Wenn die Europäer weiterhin den USA in ihrer Kritik an China folgen, werden sie für sich wenig erreichen.
   
   
6. Angesichts zahlreicher sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Krisen im eigenen Land sollte sich die EU auf die Behebung ihrer eigenen systemischen Mängel konzentrieren, anstatt die Schuld auf China abzuwälzen.
   
   
7. Die Verschärfung der Spannungen um Seltene Erden dient hauptsächlich dazu, von innerpolitischen Problemen abzulenken und gleichzeitig Chancen für eine pragmatische Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und China zu verspielen.

Wenn es Europa nicht gelingt, rechtzeitig eine Einheit zu bilden, die sowohl willens als auch in der Lage ist, eine eigenständige, unabhängige Politik zu verfolgen, werden wir zwischen den Mühlsteinen der geopolitischen Großmächte zerrieben werden.

Dieser Prozess scheint bereits in weit fortgeschritten zu sein.

The EU's terrifying helplessness

A short note on the image: The AI ​​misunderstood my request somewhat. Change requests were pointless.
It would only have lead to a completely different result. The image is still impressive though :-)

In his today's newsletter “Sinification”, Jacob Mardell aptly summarized Zhao Junjie’s arguments under the title “The EU’s ‘Rare Earth Fear’”. 

"The anxiety and helplessness the EU has displayed over the rare earth issue reveal the contradictions and dilemmas at the heart of its policy towards China."

Mardell continues: “Though often unfair, if not misguided, Zhao’s commentary contains a few uncomfortable barbs — noting, for instance, that Europe’s rare-earth predicament is partly of its own making, the result of years spent offshoring resource-intensive industry to developing countries.”

Junjie’s forewarning of a US-China détente is especially jarring: “When” — not ‘if’ — “China and the United States reach a consensus or reconcile, the EU will find itself in an increasingly awkward position”, he insists.

The key points of this official Chinese view on Europe should not be ignored:

1. Europe’s fixation on the rare earth issue reflects Brussels’ deep strategic anxiety rather than a purely economic concern.
   
   
2. The vulnerability is largely self-inflicted, after years of offshoring dirty, resource-intensive industries to developing countries.
   
   
3. Instead of industrial power, Europe chose to leverage its market size and wield regulations to project normative power globally.
   
   
4. Europe’s vulnerability is real, but precisely because of this, it should avoid politicising the rare earth question and overextending the concept of national security — that it continues to do so is symptomatic of its arrogance.
   
   
5. Washington prioritises its own interests and sees the EU as a strategic pawn; if Europeans continue to follow the US in criticising China, they will gain little in return.
   
   
6. Facing multiple social and economic crises at home, the EU should focus on confronting its own systemic flaws rather than externalising blame onto China.
   
   
7. Aggravating tensions over rare earths mainly serves to distract from domestic problems, while squandering opportunities for pragmatic cooperation between the EU and China.

If Europe fails to forge a unity in time, one that is both willing and able to pursue its own independent policies, we will be crushed between the millstones of the geopolitical major powers.

It appears that this process is already well underway.