From paralysis to action - a stepwise approach

Humanity faces major challenges.

This is a well-known fact. We have pointed it out repeatedly in our last series “Why we need the Europeans of the Planet”, published on Friday, 2026-07-10.

There is no need to repeat ourselves here again. Nor do we stand alone with our political demands.

Admittedly, there is a distinct and growing "retro" movement that simply denies we are heading — globally and especially in Europe — toward an ecological catastrophe, drifting politically away from our former ideals of freedom, and operating under economic models that cannot function as expected in the long run. In some countries, they are already in power. There, in open disregard of all warning signs, renewable energies are obstructed or even banned, man-made changes that have already occurred are downplayed, and scientific findings are ignored.

Nevertheless, a large part of the population—perhaps even the vast majority—shares the view that we need to change course economically to preserve the foundations of our lives in the long term. Furthermore, hardly any of the remaining "moderate" governments denies that too many people are currently consuming too many resources, or that there is no credible technological breakthrough that would allow us to continue present patterns of consumption, land use and emissions without deep structural change.

The words are spoken, but where are the actions?

Ideally, it is our elected political establishment that should be taking action—ideally. And therein lies the problem. We delegate our political mandate – which, as citizens in a democracy, we are entitled to – to professional politicians for an upcoming parliamentary term.

Decisions that ultimately determine our long-term future are thus in the hands of a professional political class for whom being re-elected generally is more important than fulfilling their long-term responsibilities. Over time, its original function has increasingly taken a back seat. As they focus on short-term results, they rarely stick to what they promised before the election.

The reasons for this are manifold:

• Time – Sustainable changes take time to take effect. Yet a legislative term—during which an elected representative must "prove" themselves—lasts only four to five years. [1], [2]
  
  
• Consequence – Measures intended to yield lastingly better conditions often require so-called "uncomfortable decisions." Yet, as short-term decisions are rewarded, such decisions are an absolute no-go. So, those in charge opt for the second-best alternative – or even worse. [3], [4]
  
  
• Flawed Selection – The way politics is currently conducted acts like a magnet for power-hungry egomaniacs, vain self-promoters, and occasionally outright crooks. Essentially "wolves in sheep's clothing," they use the sweetest words and make the most flowery promises before the election—only to pursue their true, underlying agendas once they have actually been voted into office. [5],[6],[7]
  
  
• Cult of Leadership – Although history should have taught us that pinning our hopes on strong "leaders"—figures promising to sweep away all obstacles like a resurrected Hercules and guide us toward a bright future—usually spells our ruin or at least our decline, we repeatedly fall for "strong men and women," and indeed practically demand them. [8]

A call to action

The list goes on—and it will continue to do so.

And we, the people, feel helpless. We are too preoccupied with our daily obligations or even fall prey to radical demagogues at the extreme ends of the political spectrum.

It is by no means certain how this situation will play out: whether nothing will happen at all, whether action will come too late and be insufficient, or whether we might even head in the wrong direction.

Perhaps we really ought to do something about it!

Well, we should. And here is the call to action: We have limited ourselves to seven key elements of our message – some are not particularly original, whilst others may seem radically different from the norm.

The seven key elements to be discussed in a bit more depth during the following weeks will deliver answers to the following questions …

1. Why a political party at all?
2. Why did we Europeans establish a German party?
3. Why do we call our community a ‘members’ party’?
4. Why do we want all of us to be part-time politicians – and no one a career politician?
5. Why do we strictly value program over person?
6. Why do we opt for a ‘boring’ but consistent approach without all the usual fuss?
7. Why there should be a political oracle to explain our world view to every amateur politician.

The answers to these questions undoubtedly fall into a difficult category—that of effective implementation. And that is precisely what this series will focus on, starting this coming Friday.

So, please stay tuned

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[1] Jacobs, A. M. (2011). Governing for the long term: Democracy and the politics of investment. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921766

• Jacobs is the strongest academic source for the intertemporal logic behind our “Time” and “Consequence” bullets. His concept of “policy investment” captures precisely the dilemma you describe: political actors must often impose visible costs now to produce benefits only much later. That makes long-term decisions politically fragile, particularly when voters’ attention, institutional capacity and organised interests favour the short term. Cambridge’s front matter confirms the title, author, publisher, publication year and the book’s focus on “democracy and the politics of investment.”

[2] Boston, J. (2017). Governing for the future: Designing democratic institutions for a better tomorrow. Emerald Publishing.

• Boston’s book directly addresses democratic short-termism, or what he calls “presentist bias”: the tendency of governments to place undue weight on near-term political considerations at the expense of long-term welfare. This fits our argument almost exactly, especially where you criticise four- or five-year parliamentary terms as structurally misaligned with ecological, fiscal and civilisational time horizons. Emerald’s description confirms that the book focuses on prudent long-term democratic governance and the institutional challenge of short-termism.

[3] Weaver, R. K. (1986). The politics of blame avoidance. Journal of Public Policy, 6(4), 371–398. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00004219

• Weaver argues that politicians are often more motivated to avoid blame for unpopular actions than to claim credit for good policy. This maps directly onto our argument that necessary but uncomfortable decisions are postponed, diluted or replaced by second-best alternatives. The RePEc/Cambridge listing summarises the article’s thesis: incentives to avoid blame produce strategies such as agenda limitation, scapegoating and passing the buck.

[4] Pierson, P. (1994). Dismantling the welfare state? Reagan, Thatcher, and the politics of retrenchment. Cambridge University Press.

• Pierson is useful for the “Consequence” bullet because he explains why painful policy changes are politically difficult. Retrenchment politics differs from expansionary politics: taking away benefits or imposing losses mobilises resistance, encourages blame avoidance and often leads governments to hide, divide or compensate affected groups. This supports our claim that politicians often avoid “uncomfortable decisions,” but it does so in a more precise institutional vocabulary. Cambridge’s description notes that retrenchment succeeds only under certain political strategies, including dividing supporters, compensating those affected, or hiding the effects from critics.

[5] Besley, T. (2005). Political selection. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 43–60. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533005774357761

• Besley provides a mainstream political-economy framework for thinking about who enters politics and how institutional structures influence the quality of political leadership. This is a more academically robust support for our “Flawed Selection” section than relying only on polemical or psychological language. It lets you argue that the problem is not merely personal moral failure, but the way political systems select, reward and elevate certain types of people. The AEA page confirms the article details and summarises the central question: how political institutions shape who rises to power.

[6] Blais, J., & Pruysers, S. (2017). The power of the dark side: Personality, the Dark Triad, and political ambition. Personality and Individual Differences, 113, 167–172. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.03.029

• This is highly relevant to our “Flawed Selection” argument, but should be used carefully. The study examines the relationship between political ambition and the so-called Dark Triad: Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy. It does not prove that politicians as a class are pathological, but it does provide empirical support for the concern that some darker personality traits may be associated with political ambition. This gives our mildly agitating language a more defensible evidentiary anchor. The article’s abstract and section snippets state that the study assessed the HEXACO model and Dark Triad traits as predictors of nascent political ambition.

[7] Łobaczewski, A. M. (2007). Political ponerology: A science on the nature of evil adjusted for political purposes (A. Chciuk-Celt, Trans.; 2nd ed.). Red Pill Press.

• Treat this reference as a provocative political-psychological warning, not as a mainstream empirical authority. It fits our “wolves in sheep’s clothing” language and our concern that destructive personalities can exploit political systems. However, because the book is controversial and not part of the core political-science canon, I recommend pairing it with Besley (2005) and Blais and Pruysers (2017). Open Library confirms the 2007 second edition, subtitle, publisher, translator and ISBN details.

[8] Brown, A. (2014). The myth of the strong leader: Political leadership in the modern age. Basic Books.

• Brown challenges the common assumption that leaders who dominate colleagues, institutions and decision-making processes are necessarily the most effective. He argues that cooperative, collegial and institutionally embedded leadership is often more successful than the theatrical “strong leader” model. This supports our claim that societies repeatedly confuse forceful personal dominance with genuine political capacity. The publisher’s description explicitly states that Brown challenges the widespread belief that dominating leaders are the most successful or admirable.