Why Does Politics Need to Become Boring?

Because Serious Work Does Not Need Daily Theatre

In our previous contribution, “Less Personality, More Programme,” we argued that a good party platform can save us a great deal of trouble, confusion and endless repetition.

A programme does not abolish political judgement. - But it gives judgement a compass.

It helps members decide whether a new proposal, a new crisis or a new public debate fits the party’s principles, priorities and long-term mission. It prevents every discussion from starting again at zero. It reduces dependence on charismatic personalities. It makes politics more reliable.

But a programme alone is not enough. - A party also needs a working culture.

That brings us to the sixth question in our series:

Why do we opt for a “boring” but consistent approach without all the usual fuss?

The answer is simple:

→ Because serious politics does not need daily theatre.

What: Politics should become boring — in the right sense

Let us begin by preventing a misunderstanding.

When we say that politics needs to become boring, we do not mean that politics should become lifeless, cowardly, emotionless or technocratic.

• ✘We do not mean that conflict should disappear.
• ✘We do not mean that injustice should be met with polite silence.
• ✘We do not mean that moral passion has no place in politics.
• ✘We do not mean that citizens should be pacified by administrative language.

Politics is about real conflicts, real interests, real suffering, real hopes and real futures. A politics without moral energy would not be more democratic. It would merely be colder.

So, what do we mean?

We mean that politics should become boring in the same sense in which good engineering, good accounting, good medicine and good administration are boring: reliable, disciplined, transparent, competent and not dependent on daily drama.

Boring does not mean passionless.

It means that passion is put in service of reason, programme and responsibility — not in service of spectacle.

Our strategic statement is this:

Europeans for the Planet wants a political working culture that is sober, programme-led, ethically grounded and predictable — because a members’ party of part-time political adults cannot succeed if it imitates the rituals of permanent political theatre.

How: Less theatre, more work

Much of what passes for politics today is performance.

• A politician gives a fiery speech.
• A rival is denounced.
• A phrase is sharpened for the evening news.
• A conflict is dramatised.
• A social-media wave is provoked.
• A party declares that an opponent has finally revealed their true face.

The other side responds in kind. The next day, the cycle begins again.

Everyone is excited. Almost nothing has been clarified.

This is not accidental.

In a highly personalised political landscape, attention is currency. A politician unknown to the public struggles to be elected, even if the programme is excellent. A movement without a recognisable face struggles to be covered, even if its reasoning is sound. Media logic rewards conflict, novelty, visibility and emotion. Social media intensifies this further.

We are not blind to that reality.

But we do not believe that a serious party should simply surrender to it.

Our task is not to produce a new spectacle every morning. Our task is to do political work: to understand the world, apply our programme, develop proposals, organise members, explain decisions, correct errors and build trust.

That kind of work is rarely theatrical.

• It is often repetitive.
• It is often careful.
• It is often slow.
• It is often invisible.
• It is often, frankly, boring.

But it is also necessary.

Why: We need rivals, not enemies

Political parties differ.

• They hold different views.
• They draw support from different social groups.
• They have different histories, interests, worldviews and cultures of interaction.
• They compete for the support of the same finite body of voters.

So yes, they are rivals. - But rivals are not automatically enemies.

This distinction matters.

A party that constantly speaks of “fighting” its opponents may excite its own supporters for a while. But democratic politics is not war by other means. In a parliamentary democracy, today’s rival may become tomorrow’s coalition partner, negotiating counterpart or necessary ally in defence of a constitutional principle.

Someone who has just delivered a dramatic speech condemning the allegedly disastrous policies of another party may, not long afterwards, need to enter into a relationship of trust with that same party.

Why then poison the well unnecessarily?

• We can certainly criticise other parties. We must.
• We can expose contradictions in their programmes.
• We can reject proposals we consider harmful.
• We can argue forcefully against decisions we believe to be wrong.
• We can draw clear democratic boundaries where necessary.

But we should criticise policies before personalities, arguments before motives, programmes before tribes.

The point is not to be soft. The point is to remain useful.

A members’ party should not waste its limited civic energy on ritualised hostility. It should concentrate on building, explaining and improving its own agenda.

Why: Part-time politicians cannot afford ritual outrage

This is also a practical matter.

Professional politicians without ordinary day jobs may have time for the many ritual quarrels that occur inside and outside parties: factional manoeuvres, tactical escalations, symbolic conflicts, retaliatory remarks, positioning exercises, and carefully staged indignation.

Our members do not.

A part-time political adult may have one hour at the kitchen table after work.

Probably less.

In that hour, they do not need a new scandal manufactured for attention.

• ✘They do not need another enemy image.
• ✘They do not need a daily command to be outraged.
• ✘They do not need to spend their scarce civic energy defending someone’s careless phrase.
• ✘They do not need a domestic peace disturbed by conflicts that add no substance.
• ✔They need orientation.

They need to understand what happened, why it matters, what our programme says, what options exist, which trade-offs are real, and what can be done.

If political work is to fit into ordinary lives, then political communication must respect ordinary lives.

→ That is why a boring politics is not a luxury. It is a precondition for broad participation.

The ethical foundation: reason before raw emotion

Our political ethics are rooted in the European Enlightenment.

That does not mean we worship abstract reason detached from human life. The Enlightenment at its best was never merely cold calculation. It was a discipline of public reasoning: the courage to examine claims, test authority, give reasons, revise errors and treat other human beings as capable of judgement.

That is the spirit we need.

Raw, unthinking emotion is easy to stir.

• Fear is easy.
• Resentment is easy.
• Mockery is easy.
• Suspicion is easy.
• Humiliation is easy.
• Daily outrage is easy.

Reason is harder.

• It requires patience.
• It requires evidence.
• It requires comparison.
• It requires the willingness to ask whether one’s own side may be wrong.
• It requires the courage to remain calm when calmness is unfashionable.

We therefore reject the politics of permanent emotional arousal.

Not because emotions are irrelevant. - They are not.

• Concern for children and grandchildren is emotional.
• Love of freedom is emotional.
• Grief over ecological destruction is emotional.
• Anger at injustice may be justified.
• Hope for Europe is emotional.

But these emotions must be disciplined by reason and shaped into responsible action.

Otherwise, they become fuel for manipulation.

What this means in practice

A boring political culture does not mean doing nothing.

It means working differently.

• ✘It means we do not comment on every provocation.
• ✘It means we do not mistake speed for seriousness.
• ✘It means we do not vilify democratic rivals by default.
• ✘It means we do not turn every disagreement into a moral emergency.
• ✘It means we do not allow social media to set our agenda.
• ✘It means we do not measure political value by applause, anger or reach alone.

Instead, we ask:

• ✔What does our programme say?
• ✔What are the facts?
• ✔Which values are affected?
• ✔Who is harmed?
• ✔Who benefits?
• ✔Which trade-offs are real?
• ✔What would be proportionate?
• ✔What can we actually do?
• ✔What should we explain to our members?
• ✔What should we report back to citizens?

In ordinary times, this may lead to regular, sober progress reports rather than daily drama.

• What have we worked on?
• What have we learned?
• Where did members contribute?
• Which proposals are being developed?
• What remains open?
• Where did we change our view?
• What comes next?

Would it not be refreshing if political actors simply did good work quietly and unobtrusively, and then reported regularly on progress?

Not as a spectacle. - As accountability.

External crises: enough excitement will come from outside

This does not mean that politics will become uneventful.

Quite the opposite.

External developments will provide more than enough drama: geopolitical crises, climate shocks, migration pressures, technological disruptions, financial instability, democratic backsliding, conflicts beyond Europe’s borders and conflicts within it.

A party cannot control such events. - But it can control how it responds.

Our reactions should flow logically from the worldview set out in our programme. They should be understandable to members before they are announced to the public. They should contain as few surprises as possible.

Predictability is not weakness. In democratic politics, predictability can be a virtue.

Citizens should be able to anticipate how a party will reason, even before it has issued a statement. Members should not have to wonder whether a spokesperson’s personal mood will redirect the party overnight. Coalition partners should be able to trust that declared principles will not evaporate under pressure.

A boring party is not a passive party.

It is a party whose reactions are intelligible because its principles are known.

What follows: Boring politics makes membership possible

A membership-based party can only collaborate successfully within such a working culture.

• ✘If members are constantly mobilised through anger, they will burn out.
• ✘If rivals are constantly vilified, cooperation becomes harder.
• ✘If every issue becomes theatre, substance disappears.
• ✘If every public statement is designed for maximum attention, trust suffers.
• ✘If internal discussion imitates social-media combat, ordinary citizens will leave.

A party of part-time political adults needs a different rhythm.

• ✔It needs calm urgency.
• ✔It needs principled disagreement.
• ✔It needs disciplined language.
• ✔It needs structured debate.
• ✔It needs regular explanation.
• ✔It needs sober reporting.
• ✔It needs ethical consistency.
• ✔It needs patience without passivity.

That may sound boring. - Good.

Democracy could use more boring competence.

• ✘Not less conviction.
• ✘Not less courage.
• ✘Not less moral seriousness.
  
  
• ->But less theatre.
  
  
• ✔Less noise.
• ✔Less vanity.
• ✔Less ritual hostility.
• ✔Less daily outrage.
  
  
• -> And more work.

Next Friday, we will address the final question in this series:

The political oracle — can an AI agent help us navigate the flood of information?

2 Annotated APA 7 references

1. Bormann, M., Tranow, U., Vowe, G., & Ziegele, M. (2022). Effects of political incivility on political trust and political participation: A meta-analysis of experimental research. Human Communication Research, 48(2), 203–229.
• This meta-analysis is directly relevant to article #6 because it examines whether uncivil political communication affects trust and participation. The authors found that incivility has a negative effect on political trust, while its average effect on political participation is close to zero; in Europe, the effect on participation was small and negative. This supports the argument that verbal aggression may attract attention without strengthening democratic engagement.


2. Edelman, M. (1988). Constructing the political spectacle. University of Chicago Press.
• Edelman is one of the most useful references for the critique of political theatre. His work challenges the assumption that citizens simply react rationally to facts and examines how political leaders, enemies, social problems and news are constructed as spectacle. This supports the article’s claim that much political drama is not neutral communication but a symbolic performance shaping public fear, hope and attention.


3. Esmark, A. (2020). The new technocracy. Policy Press.
• Esmark is important as a warning against overcorrecting towards sterile technocracy. His work analyses how technocratic governance can depoliticise democratic choices and contribute to populist backlash. This reference should be used to clarify that “boring politics” does not mean rule by experts or the suppression of conflict; it means responsible democratic work conducted with less spectacle.


4. Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. (2004). Why deliberative democracy? Princeton University Press.
• Gutmann and Thompson provide the normative backbone for a politics of reason-giving and mutual respect. Their deliberative model does not abolish disagreement, but asks citizens and representatives to justify public decisions with reasons that others can assess. This supports the article’s distinction between legitimate conflict and theatrical hostility.


5. Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 129–146.
• This reference is useful for explaining why politics should avoid unnecessary enemy-making. Affective polarisation concerns dislike and distrust of opposing partisan groups, not merely disagreement over policy. While the article focuses on Europe, the concept is relevant wherever political identities become emotionally antagonistic. It supports the call to criticise policies and programmes without automatically turning rivals into moral enemies.


6. Landerer, N. (2013). Rethinking the logics: A conceptual framework for the mediatization of politics. Communication Theory, 23(3), 239–258.
• Landerer helps explain why political actors adapt to media logic. The article is useful for the claim that modern politics is pulled towards visibility, audience orientation and simplified conflict. It supports the argument that a sober party culture must deliberately resist the incentives of an attention-driven media environment.


7. Lau, R. R., Sigelman, L., & Rovner, I. B. (2007). The effects of negative political campaigns: A meta-analytic reassessment. The Journal of Politics, 69(4), 1176–1209.
• This meta-analysis is useful because it complicates the assumption that aggressive campaigning is simply effective politics. The authors found no reliable evidence that negative campaigning is an especially effective way to win votes, although it is more memorable; they also found slight negative effects on political efficacy, trust in government and public mood. This supports the article’s scepticism towards ritualised attack politics.


8. Manin, B. (1997). The principles of representative government. Cambridge University Press.
• Manin’s discussion of the transformation from party democracy to “audience democracy” is useful for understanding why modern politics becomes increasingly oriented towards public performance and media-facing personalities. His work supports the article’s diagnosis that politics is often staged for audiences rather than organised as patient collective work.


9. Moffitt, B. (2016). The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation. Stanford University Press.
• Moffitt provides a contemporary theory of politics as performance, especially in populist style. He identifies three central features of populism as political style: appeal to “the people” versus “the elite,” “bad manners,” and crisis, breakdown or threat. This is highly relevant to the article’s critique of permanent drama and manufactured urgency.


10. Mouffe, C. (2013). Agonistics: Thinking the world politically. Verso.
• Mouffe is important as a counterweight to excessive deliberative calm. Her agonistic theory insists that pluralist democracy needs conflict and passion, but that democratic institutions should turn antagonism into agonism: rivals should be adversaries whose right to contest is recognised, not enemies to be destroyed. This supports the article’s refined claim: boring politics should not suppress conflict; it should civilise it.


11. Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
• Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser define populism as a thin-centred ideology that divides society into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite.” This reference is useful for warning against political language that turns disagreement into moral war. It supports the article’s preference for rivals and competitors over enemies.


12. Van Aelst, P., Sheafer, T., & Stanyer, J. (2012). The personalization of mediated political communication: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. Journalism, 13(2), 203–220.
• This review is useful for grounding the broader claim that mediated political communication often becomes personalised. It helps explain why politics tends to focus on faces, leaders and individual drama rather than programmes, procedures and institutional work. It supports the article’s claim that a programme-led, sober party culture must work against the incentives of contemporary media.