A European Federation as a Preservation Strategy

Why Europe must complete its political formation in order to gain a voice as a respected power on the world stage, preserve its Enlightenment heritage, and possibly re-establish itself as a multinational federal state.

As indicated in my recent Blog post “The Awakening of the Mosaic - An Inaugural Address” on 2026-02-06 besides the remnants of a dream a more in-depth contemplation about an envisioned European Federations is due. If the primary purpose of dreaming is to tidy up the brain and separate the important from the unimportant, then I hope that this has now been accomplished.

Europe at a Structural Threshold

Europe is once again discussing its political future – not out of enthusiasm, but out of necessity. Rudely awakened from a comfortable slumber by harsh words from its big brother across the Atlantic, the nations involved in the ‘Europe’ project are now realising that submissive behaviour is no longer enough to ensure a pleasant life.

Calls for a European federation are therefore resurfacing at an increasing rate. They are not new. From Winston Churchill to Mario Draghi, from Jaques Delors to IMF’s Alfred Kammer and Gita Bhatt for more than 60 years, this demand has been repeatedly raised by prominent figures.

Their justifications differed during that time …

• Pre-1990: Federalism as peace project
• 1990–2010: Federalism as governability problem solution
• Post-2016: Federalism as geopolitical necessity

And yet, nothing has happened.

Jvan Ricciardella, defence and geopolitical advisor, who regularly posts his clear-sighted but often scathing comments on the helpless policies of European states on LinkedIn, diagnoses the situation in a contribution titled “Europe Between Illusion and Gravity” (2026-01-28) as follows …

“Europe likes to think of itself as a political subject, yet it increasingly behaves like a geopolitical object, pulled apart by forces it neither controls nor fully understands. 

Markets without power, rules without strategy, unity without sovereignty: the European experiment is now colliding with geography, history, and hard power, and the collision is not gentle. 

This is not a call for slogans or moral comfort, but an attempt to look at Europe as it is, not as it wishes to be.”

That’s by no means a new insight. As early as in the early 1960s, Charles de Gaulle repeatedly warned, Western Europe risked becoming excessively dependent on American leadership in security and foreign policy—effectively a “protectorate” in his terms—if it failed to assert its own strategic autonomy and political sovereignty.

The question Europe faces today is not whether federalisation is appealing in theory, but whether the achievements of the European Enlightenment can endure without a political form capable of protecting them.^[6]

So, which where the forces holding us back throughout all these lost decades?

Is there a chance to succeed now? 

And, if yes, which conditions must be met?

Why Europe Has Not Become a Federation

Europe’s incomplete political form is not the result of a lack of ideas or advocates. It reflects deep structural forces. European states are old, sovereign, administratively complete entities. Federalisation here is not a natural completion of statehood, but a deliberate act of self-limitation. This creates political resistance that is rational, not reactionary.

Moreover, Europe lacks a unified political demos willing to accept permanent majority rule over core sovereignty questions. Integration has therefore advanced primarily through courts, regulations, and technocratic mechanisms—effective, but politically fragile. These forces once stabilised Europe. Today, they increasingly prevent it from adapting.^[7]

At the same time, the current EU architecture incentivises integration without responsibility. National governments benefit from shared markets, stability mechanisms, and collective regulation, while retaining the ability to shift political blame to “Brussels”. This ambiguity is electorally convenient but strategically corrosive.

This third and by far most crucial point reveals deeper structural contradictions in the way we have implemented our representative democracy.

Once every five years, we elect our representatives. After that, they are free to do whatever they personally deem appropriate. We can only vote for candidates who have made it onto a list of candidates through a selection that favours the rise of psychopaths obsessed with power. They are professional politicians whose careers are constantly at risk. Their main focus is therefore on their careers. They are elected on the basis of unrealistic promises, which are replaced by solemn words immediately after election day and then promptly forgotten. It is clear that none of them will voluntarily take on such a daunting task as recreating a multinational state called “Europe.”

The European Union is not an unfinished federation. It is a deliberately avoided one.

We therefore not only need a different policy—we also need to pursue it differently.

The Cost of Remaining Fragmented

The path to achieving this may be arduous, but there is no alternative if the small European states do not want to be crushed between the world powers. If Europe remains strategically fragmented while the world consolidates, the outcome is unlikely to be dramatic collapse. It is more likely to be gradual marginalisation.

Externally, Europe already pretends to be a single economic space and political actor - but without unified agencies. This invites divide-and-rule strategies and weakens Europe’s bargaining power in security, trade, technology, and finance. Internally, strategic dependency becomes structural. Energy, defence, digital infrastructure, and capital markets drift beyond European control. Values persist rhetorically, but lose enforcement capacity.

History suggests a simple rule: Only an actor who is perceived by the outside world as an indivisible monolith has a chance of being taken seriously on the world stage..

Federal Externally, Plural Internally

One of the most persistent objections to a European federation is the fear of uniformity. This fear misunderstands federalism. Federations do not erase diversity. They stabilise it.^[4]

A European federation would centralise authority where external coherence is required—foreign policy, defence, monetary stability, strategic investment—while decentralising identity, culture, education, and social models. Cultural diversity is safer inside a constitutional federation than between sovereign states whose borders carry existential weight. Federalism is not a denial of pluralism; it is a constitutional technology for managing it peacefully.

Europe already lives cultural federalism in practice. What it lacks is the political structure to protect it under pressure.

Federalisation as Conservation, Not Utopia

Advocating a European federation today is not revolutionary. It is conservative in the deepest sense: conserving Europe’s achievements by adapting its political form to contemporary realities.

A federation would not promise perfection. It would restore democratic clarity, align authority with responsibility, and equip Europe with the institutional scale required to act in a consolidated world. This is not about dissolving nations. It is about ensuring that Europe’s nations, regions, and citizens retain agency in a system where fragmentation increasingly equals dependency.^[3]

Our choice: Managed Unity or Unmanaged Decline?

Europe’s choice is no longer between sovereignty and integration. It is between institutional adequacy and structural erosion. Remaining a loose confederation preserves comfort and familiarity—but comfort is not resilience.

Completing Europe’s political architecture is not a betrayal of its diversity. It is the condition for preserving it.

And for that very reason the third short-term pillar of the threefold mission, the "Europeans of the Planet", the party for Europe's place in the world, is the creation of  a multination state named "Europe".

References

The references below are selected to support a federalist argument while also engaging the strongest counterforces and legitimacy critiques. They are suitable for further reading..

1. Churchill, W. (1946, September 19). The tragedy of Europe [Speech]. University of Zurich.
   • Foundational post-war “United States of Europe” formulation,  a historically legitimate entry-point for federalist advocacy.


2. Spinelli, A., & Rossi, E. (1941/2006). The Ventotene Manifesto. In B. Nelsen & A. Stubb (Eds.),The European Union: Readings on the theory and practice of European integration (pp. 47–50). Lynne Rienner.
   • The classic constitutional-federalist manifesto: federalisation as the structural antidote to nationalist conflict and European power fragmentation


3. Fischer, J. (2000, May 12). From confederation to federation: Thoughts on the finality of European integration [Speech]. Humboldt University, Berlin.
   • The clearest high-level political statement linking Europe’s “finality” to a federation; valuable for arguing institutional adequacy rather than idealism.


4. Delors, J. (1992). Subsidiarity: The key to Europe’s future. European Institute of Public Administration.
   • Provides the bridge concept of a “federation of nation states,” enabling a “federal externally, plural internally” thesis grounded in subsidiarity.


5. Verhofstadt, G. (2006). The United States of Europe. Federal Trust.
   • Modern federalist manifesto arguing that confederal Europe cannot withstand systemic shocks (financial, geopolitical, technological) without federal capacity.


6. Habermas, J. (2012). The crisis of the European Union: A response. Polity Press.
   • Philosophical foundation for post-national democracy and constitutional federalism as a continuation of Enlightenment rationalism under global interdependence.


7. Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2019). The light that failed: A reckoning. Penguin.
   • Essential to address legitimacy and backlash dynamics: explains why “integration by stealth” can trigger democratic resistance even when policy arguments are strong.


8. Thatcher, M. (1988). Speech to the College of Europe (“Bruges Speech”). Bruges.
   • Canonical sovereignty-centric critique; useful for presenting counterarguments fairly and then rebutting them with “federal externally / plural internally.”


9. Bundesverfassungsgericht. (2009). Judgment of 30 June 2009 (Lisbon Treaty), BVerfGE 123, 267.
   • Key message: European integration is constitutionally permissible, but only as long as Germany remains a sovereign democratic state; the EU must not evolve into a federal state without explicit democratic re-founding by the German people.


10. Polanyi, K. (1944/2001). The great transformation. Beacon Press.
    • Not EU-specific but analytically powerful: markets require political embedding; supports the claim that continental-scale markets without continental governance are unstable.